UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF WAR GAMES:
A LOOK BEYOND THE BLACK BOX ARTHUR SCOTT MOBLEY, JR.
War games are currently enjoying a revival of interest and popularity within the American defense community.
Strategists, analysts, and policy-makers alike are turning more and more to gaming as a medium for education, planning and discovery. War games facilitate multi-dimensional examination of strategic issues without risk and at relatively little expense:
Gaming provides a means of gaining useful experience and information in advance of an actual commitment, of experimenting with forces and situations that are too remote, too costly or too complicated to mobilize and manipulate, and of exploring and shaping the organizations and systems of the future.
(McHugh,
1966, p. 1-25)
In an era obsessed with "static measures" and "bean counts,"
wargaming offers a critical yet refreshing opportunity to study the dynamic qualities of strategy, tactics, and militarypolitical affairs.
The word "game" has a number of meanings, several of which are relevant to defense policy studies. Broadly speaking, a game is a competition between two or more decision centers, none having perfect intelligence on the other (Quade, 1975, p. 199) .
A more refined definition, and one of greater significance to the 0 strategist, specifies the game as a competitive or conflict 0 situation in which opposing human players influence events with their own decisions. Two important categories of gaming are the "war game" and the "strategic game." The war game is simply a game that simulates political or military conflict without operating real forces.
The strategic, or political-military game is a type of war game that examines a full range of political, military, economic, and social issues with regard to a nation's overall security policy (Brewer and Shubik, 1979, p. 377) . Within the context of this paper, all gaming is regarded as a human function; every game must contain some explicit decisionmaking by one or more human players.
WAR GAMING AS A SUPPLEMENT TO ANALYSIS
With its roots in physical science, analysis assists in policy formulation by applying empirical procedures:
The physical sciences are the paradigm of analysis.
Analysts build mathematical models of reality, take measurements to quantify the parameters of the models, and manipulate both models and parameters to learn about reality or to find the "best" solutions to the problems it poses. (Perla and Branting, 1986, p. 2) Despite its ability to scientifically examine many elements of policy, analysis comes up short on matters outside the physical Gaming and analysis each function well within its own paradigm. If analysis often fails to provide the policy-maker with practical insight, gaming cannot always address important matters more suited to quantification. In truth, the prudent analyst and wise strategist will use both approaches to develop policy:
Large-scale political and operational decisions modeled, however imperfectly, in a wargame can sometimes have more important effects on the conduct and utility of an operation than the detection range of a sonar or the probability of accurate weapons placement given detonation. Yet, without the understanding of the latter factors provided by good analysis, the decisions can be too abstract, too sterile, and their effects assumed rather than assessed.
The gaming and analysis pieces must fit together. (Perla and Branting, 1986, p. 10) USING WAR GAMES Despite their limitations, war games can produce unique and illuminating perspectives on many complex security issues. Such games offer a multi-dimensional medium for education, planning and discovery, largely because of their ability to capture and convey qualities beyond the reach of conventional analytic techniques.
While recognizing the substantial potential of war games, caution must nevertheless be exercised in their application. Too much faith in any single methodology, including gaming, is often a mistake.
Strategists and analysts should both remember that games simply cannot address every aspect of the problems they may confront.
"In general," comments Robert Mandel, "war games appear most necessary when other approaches to military analysis are costly, risky, ethically controversial, or simply unavailable." (Mandel, 1985, p. 485) If rigor and replication are needed, as in the study of phenomena subject mainly to the physical paradigm, treatment with analytical methods is probably more in order.
This is because the "human" factor so important to games also If, on the other hand, the topics under consideration are related more to the historical paradigm, the methodology of gaming is entirely appropriate. Precision and replicability are not necessarily prerequisites for meaningful examination of many qualitative strategic issues, and it is to the study of these hard-to-measure attributes that war games should be utilized.
Having determine the applicability of the war game to the issues at hand, the strategist/analyst must design and conduct his gaming with care.
Human nature being what it is, the artificialities of gaming are sometimes easy to overlook, especially in a well-developed game with highly believable scenarios and mechanics: "War games attempt to create the illusion of reality and where this has been done successfully, the game can be a powerful and sometimes insidious influence, especially on those who have limited operational experience." (Perla and Barrett, 1985b, p. 77) . Thus the war game is a double-edged sword.
Where it can impart a sense of reality to otherwise recondite ideas, it can also, if used carelessly, create an aura of illusion.
In his study entitled Unintended Consequences of Strategic Gaming, Paul Bracken identifies three undesirable results fostered by war games and simulations, or rather their misapplication: unintended learning, diverted attention, and suppressed possibilities (Bracken, 1977, pp. 312-315) . These represent some of the more deleterious effects of gaming.
Many war games are intended to serve the purposes of education or advocacy: they are designed to teach specific lessons to participants. Extra caution must be exercised by the designers and users of such games, lest they backfire and foster unintended and undesired learning. Games are powerful tools, and the wrong lessons and wrong conclusions can make just as strong an impression as the "right" ones.
A war game that "proves" or "disproves" the efficacy of a characterized by judgment rather than analysis--in the narrowest sense of that term." (Brewer and Shubik, 1979, p. 72 ) The contribution of analysis, and analytic theory, to gaming is
unequivocal, but it is just as important, and perhaps more illuminating, to subject the war game to historical study and historical theorizing. The historical paradigm is built on human judgment, as is the war game, so the wise strategist will rely on history, as well as analysis, for developing his theories of war gaming.
Automated models are becoming more practical, flexible, and transparent, and more widely used in war games. With the surge of potentially useful information emanating from both computerized and manual war games, methods to extract game knowledge must be formulated. In effect, the strategic community must construct an epistemology of gaming. "No one,"
concluded Brewer and Shubik in 1979, " is certain about what game players, builders, and users, are actually getting out of play, construction or use of these devices." (Brewer and Shubik, 1979, p. 73) This statement apparently still holds true nine years later, in light of the relative dearth of studies that deal with information from war games. 1 It seems that much work remains to be done to build a body of knowledge derived from gaming.
To encourage proper examination and interpretation of war game knowledge, every game should incorporate complete documentation and a formal analysis plan. Larger game facilities may benefit even further by developing an organization like the Analysis Group found at the Naval War College's Global War Game, devoted entirely to the study of war game information.
Participants can assist in the work of these groups by keeping "battle diaries": notes made during actual game play of their observations, thoughts, reasoning, and decisions (Perla, 1986, p. 30 -1619 -PR, September 1975 Mandel, Robert, "Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making During Crises," World Politics, V. 29, pp. 610-625, July 1977; and Vlahos, Michael, The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919 -1941 , Naval War College Press, 1980 analysis." (Perla and Barrett, 1985a, p. 20) Like good analytical history, it will examine causal factors and motivations as well as simple event sequences. As a minimum, game documentation should include: Gaming methodology is a unique and important tool for the strategist/historian. Because of ". . . its ability to help us understand better the roles, capabilities, and limitations of that most ubiquitous warfighting system, the human being," the war game "is a powerful and effective learning device." (Perla and Barrett, 1985a, p. 18) Games are used within the defense community to educate and advocate, to plan and to organize thinking, and to help defray new ideas and insights. 
